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CRIMINAL LAW-JUVENILE COURT PROCEEDINGS-EVIDENCE--The

Penn-

sylvania Superior Court has indicated that a distinction exists as to the
admissibility of hearsay evidence in a juvenile proceeding. The distinction is based upon whether the hearsay evidence will help or hurt
the child.
Farms Appeal, 216 Pa. Super. 445, 268 A.2d 170 (1970).
The particular facts of this case are not significant for the scope of this
paper. It suffices to say that the case involves a juvenile proceeding in
which the main issue is whether certain testimony sought to be admitted into evidence constitutes an exception to the hearsay rule. In holding that it does constitute such an exception, the majority opinion
contains some dicta. It is this dicta which the writer believes is of
significance in that it displays the present philosophy in Pennsylvania
for handling juvenile proceedings. This philosophy, as will be shown,
constitutes a logical step forward in fulfilling the aims and purposes
of the juvenile system.
It is not the writer's purpose to discuss the substantive rules of
evidence but instead to "get inside the judge's mind" in order to show
(as indicated by the Pennsylvania Superior Court) what the judge's
thought processes should be when dealing with hearsay evidence in a
juvenile proceeding.
The logical starting point for tracing the Pennsylvania court's philosophy from the pre-Gault' to the post-Gault era is In re Holmes.2 This
case adequately sets forth the early views held in Pennsylvania; in addition, its colorful dissent by the late Justice Musmanno 3 was later
adopted by the majority of the United States Supreme Court in its
Gault decision.
The view of the majority in Holmes is that the juvenile court proceeding is not in the nature of a criminal trial, but a civil inquiry or
action and the goals of juvenile court proceedings are treatment, reformation, and rehabilitation of the minor child. The purpose of the
proceeding is not penal but protective-"armed to check juvenile delinquency and to throw around a child, just starting, perhaps, on an evil
course and deprived of proper parental care, the strong arm of the state
4
acting as parens patriae.

1.
2.
3.
4.
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In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
Justice M. A. Musmanno late associate justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
379 Pa. at 603, 109 A.2d at 525.
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It is also the impression of the Holme's majority that "no suggestion
or taint of criminality attaches to any finding of delinquency by a
juvenile court." 5 This philosophy led to an era in juvenile proceedings
characterized by informality, especially in regard to the rules of evidence. 6
Although the aims and purposes enunciated by the majority in
Holmes are ideal, they were not realized. This was recognized by
Musmanno in his dissenting opinion in Holmes.7
The argument was being made that in return for providing care instead of punishment for the child, the state can deny traditional due
process to the juvenile. It was "a sort of quid pro quo. But it became
obvious that the child's part of the bargain saw a definite failure of
consideration."" The situation was one of frustration for the juvenilehe received neither the protection given adults nor the fatherly hand
and rehabilitating treatment theorized for children, but, in fact, received the "worst of both worlds."
The turning point in the world of juvenile court proceedings came
in May of 1967, when the United States Supreme Court decided the
Gault case. Gerald Gault, who had been previously adjudicated a delinquent child'0 and committed to the state training school, had his
commitment reversed on the ground that he had been denied constitutional due process. This decision gave rise to a more formalized approach to juvenile proceedings.
Dean Monrad G. Paulsen" discussed the significance of Gault. "The
Gault case is a case of enormous interest because it seems to undercut
(emphasis added) one of the principal ideas that moved those who set
5. Id. at 604, 109 A.2d at 525.
6. Id. at 606, 109 A.2d at 526. "From the very nature of the hearings in the juvenile
court it cannot be required that strict rules of evidence should be applied as they properly
would be in the trial of cases in the criminal court."
7. 379 Pa. at 612, 109 A.2d at 529.
A most disturbing fallacy abides in the notion that a juvenile court record does its
owner no harm. The grim truth is that a juvenile record is a lengthening chain that
its riveted possessor will drag after him through childhood, youthhood and adulthood . . . Even when the ill-starred child becomes an old man the record will be
there to haunt, plague and torment him. It will be an ominous shadow following his
tottering steps, it will stand by his bed at night and it will hover over him when he
dozes fitfully in the dusk of his remaining day.
8. Spencer, Beyond Gault And Whittington-The Best of Both Worlds, 22 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 906 (1968).
9. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
10. The words 'delinquent child' include: "a child who has violated any law of the
Act of June 2, 1933,
commonwealth or ordinance of any city, borough or township .
P.L. 1433, § 1, PURION'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243 (1965).
11. Professor and Dean at the University of Virginia Law School.
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up the juvenile court";1 2 that principal idea being that children should
have a court room experience characterized by informality. Paulsen
states that the Gault case imposes in some juvenile court proceedings
the degree of formalism which one finds in a criminal case.13 This
results from the conclusion reached by eight of the nine judges that the
"juvenile court dream has been an illusion."' 4 Thus Gault provided
formality to the juvenile proceedings in order to give children some of
5
the procedural safeguards which apply in criminal cases.'
Since this casenote is concerned with this formality as applied to the
admissibility of hearsay evidence, it will be discussed only in this vein.
It is, however, submitted that a caveat may be necessary here. Although
a more formal proceeding is now called for, Pennsylvania has not lost
sight of the aims and purposes of the juvenile courts. This fact can be
readily seen from an analysis of the opinion in Commonwealth v. Johnson.' 6 Pennsylvania courts feel that the juvenile court system is to maintain its flexibility, within the limits prescribed by Terry Appeal, 7 that
being that the juvenile courts function with "the procedural regularity
and the exercise of care implied in the phrase 'due process'."' 8
The Supreme Court was clear that due process did not require
abandonment of this flexibility, advocated by the Pennsylvania courts,
if the juvenile's interest in a fair adjudication is not overcome thereby.' 9
In light of this, a judge sitting alone in a juvenile proceeding and
12. Paulsen, The Changing World of Juvenile Law, New Horizons For Juvenile Court
Legislation, 40 PENN. B.A.Q. 26, 27 (1968).
13. Id. at 27.
14. Id. at 28.
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
16. 211 Pa. Super. 62, 74-75, 243 A.2d 9, 16 (1967).
The Supreme Court's opinion in Gault should not be viewed by the courts and
judges of this commonwealth as a mandate to abandon the juvenile court adjudicative
procedure. Rather it is an invitation to formulate a court procedure which will
combine the best aspects of juvenile and criminal court procedure into an amalgam
which will offer the juvenile the best of both worlds. The Supreme Court in our view
recognized that there are essential differences between the trial of adults and juveniles.
Similarly, juvenile court judges must recognize these differences and exercise their
discretionary powers.
17. 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
18. Id. at 344, 265 A.2d at 352.
Due process of law is the primary and indispensible foundation of individual freedom.
It is the basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of
the individual and delimits the power which the state may exercise . . . (T)he procedural rules which have been fashioned from the generality of due process are our
best instruments for the distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting welter of data that life and our adversary methods present. It is these instruments of due process which enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the
confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting data.
19. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 366 (1970).
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having the task of determining questions of fact and law20 have the
discretion to admit hearsay evidence for what it is worth since it is his
duty to become as knowledgeable and inquisitive as reasonably possible. 21 It is the use of this discretion and how such use may differ in
adult and juvenile proceedings that the writer will presently discuss,
in an effort to show that Pennsylvania has taken steps beyond Gault
by its implementation of the juvenile procedure to further benefit the
child.
Prior to showing a benefit to the child it is essential to first examine
his plight, which resulted from the judges discretionary application of
the hearsay rule, prior to the Farms Appeal.
In Holmes, the minor was charged with armed robbery of a church.
At the hearing, the only evidence which supported this charge was the
testimony of a detective that one of the two men convicted of the same
crime in a criminal court had implicated the minor in his confession.
This confession, which implicated the minor (Holmes), was later repudiated. Nevertheless, Holmes was committed to the Pennsylvania
Industrial School. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its affirmance
of the commitment said "the fact that the testimony of the detective
was technically 'hearsay' was .

.

. wholly unimportant.2 2 Note that in

Holmes, even though the judge, as previously discussed, has the discretion to admit or not to admit hearsay evidence, he chose to exercise
his discretion and admit it even though it was harmful to the child.
In re Mont 23 is another Pennsylvania case, in which the minor

Mont was adjudged delinquent and committed to reform school. The
24
major portion of the evidence introduced in this case was hearsay.
Thus, another example of the judge allowing hearsay testimony which
operated to the child's detriment.
Both of these Pennsylvania cases are prior to the Gault decision and
although Gault did result in the formalization of juvenile proceedings,
it did not distinguish between the admissibility of hearsay in a juvenile
proceeding, in regard to its resulting benefit or detriment to the child.
20.

Katz, A Reappraisal of Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings in New York, 34 ALBANY

L. REV. 122 (1969).

21. Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1362, 1368 (1970). In practice,
hearsay in nonjury cases has not been subject to the restrictive technical rulings that are
more common in jury cases. Instead, the judge sitting alone as the trier of facts usually
admits hearsay for what it is worth without ruling on its admissibility.
22. 379 Pa. at 606, 109 A.2d at 526.
23. 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103A.2d 460 (1954).
24. Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another
Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1199 (1966).
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When faced with the decision of whether or not to admit hearsay evidence for what it is worth, different policy reasoning is presented to the
judge, depending upon whether the defendant is an adult or a juvenile.
A judge, when dealing with an adult, is concerned about releasing a
bad man into society. Here, the judge is concerned with the safety of
the public. When dealing with a mere child, on the other hand, society's
safety is not the foremost consideration; instead it is the interest that
society has in keeping this child's slate clean so that he can develop
into a useful member of his community and not be restricted by a
tainted past. 25 "The thrust of recent decisions is toward protection of
the juvenile, in areas where penal sanctions may be imposed...,,20
With these ideas in mind and in light of the past Pennsylvania decisions, 27 it is submitted that the significance of the opinion in Farms
Appeal is that today in Pennsylvania when a juvenile court judge is
faced with the exercise of this discretion he should admit the hearsay
evidence for what it is worth, if it will be to the child's benefit, and deny
its admittance into evidence if it would be harmful to the child. This
inference is drawn from the fact that in Farms Appeal the evidence if
admissible will prove a prior inconsistent statement by the key witness
for the prosecution, thereby greatly benefiting the juvenile defendant.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that such evidence should have
been admitted; however, the court stated that "we would not allow an
adjudication of delinquency based on hearsay.1 28 It is submitted that
this reasoning supports the inference that the judge is not going to use
his discretion and allow the contested evidence to be admitted if it will
be detrimental to the child.
It is the writer's opinion that had Holmes and Mont been decided
with the same philosophy that prevailed in Farms Appeal, the hearsay
testimony in the latter two cases, which led to an adjudication of delinquency, would not have been admitted into evidence.
By establishing this procedure for a judge to follow when faced
with the problem of whether or not to admit hearsay, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court has taken a logical step forward. Now the courts not
only give the child the rights given an adult in a court proceeding
(Gault), but also conduct the proceeding in such a manner as not to
25.
26.
27.
28.
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383 U.S. at 910.
Fox, Responsibility in The Juvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 659 (1970).
379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954); Comment supra note 24.
216 Pa. Super. 445, 454, 268 A.2d 170, 175 (1970).
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lose sight of the fact that he is not a hardened criminal. Instead, he is
a child with a long future ahead of him, a future that can be productive
to society.
Daniel Joseph
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